Strategy and Turning Points

Strategic approaches to negotiation exemplified by game theory often rely on quantitative information that cannot be gained from the negotiation itself. Crucially, game theoretical models presuppose accurate information on payoffs that no rational party would share. Nonetheless, limited but accurate quantitative information can be gained on the negotiation process by identifying where negotiations take a different turn. Turning points have consequences. The consequences represent short-term payoff maximizing choices of the negotiating parties. Therefore, quantitative information on consequences can be used to extrapolate how the negotiation-game was played, even if no information on payoffs is available. Based on the turning point analysis in (Crump & Druckman, 2016), the consequences in two trade negotiations are analyzed for patterns of strategic behavior. Thereby, the descriptive aspects of turning point analysis are expanded into a low-level dynamic framework that offers lessons on how negotiators should set their expectations in ministerial/council and committee level negotiations.