Getting to No: Deception Using Strategic Negotiation

A substantial literature has investigated negotiations. Throughout this literature, scholars have assumed that participants approach negotiations with the intent of reaching a deal and that negotiation participants cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process. We challenge these assumptions. We introduce the term, strategic negotiations, to characterize negotiations that involve one or more negotiators who misrepresent their intentions and use the negotiation process to pursue objectives that are very different from reaching an agreement (e.g., to stall for time or to gain information). In strategic negotiations, the feigned interest in seeking an agreement is a deceptive act with ulterior motives. We explore the implications of this broader conceptualization of negotiations both theoretically and experimentally. We demonstrate that the mere possibility of encountering a strategic negotiator significantly changes actual behavior and equilibrium outcomes. Some negotiators are directly harmed by strategic negotiators and other negotiators reject sincere overtures to negotiate. We consider theoretical, prescriptive, and policy implications of these results.