From Failed Mediation to Diplomatic Breakthrough: U.S. Third-Party Strategy in the Abraham Accords

Abstract: The Abraham Accords, signed in August 2020 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), represent a pivotal case of third-party mediation that departed from established Arab–Israeli diplomatic paradigms. This article examines the United States’ role as mediator in the Israel–UAE normalization process, situating it against the backdrop of a failed U.S.-led effort to revive Israeli–Palestinian negotiations under the Trump administration (2017–2020). Using in-depth process tracing across two mediation phases, the study analyzes how the United States recalibrated its strategy, shifting from comprehensive conflict resolution to regional realignment through transactional bargaining and elite-level diplomacy. The article conceptualizes mediation as strategic orchestration rather than neutral facilitation, distinguishing between mediators’ strategic strengths and tactical practices. Empirically, it shows how informal channels, calibrated leverage, and opportunity recognition enabled rapid agreement. The findings highlight the conditional nature of mediator bias and demonstrate how mediator effectiveness emerges from the interaction between mediator behavior, party readiness, and perceived opportunity structures.

Keywords: Mediation, MEO's, UAE-Israel