Power, Violence, and Bargaining: A Process Theory of Negotiation in Violent, Transactional Systems

Abstract: This paper advances negotiation and conflict management theory by developing an account of elite bargaining in violent, transactional political systems—contexts where violence and bribery supersede formal institutions. Drawing on in-depth qualitative fieldwork from Liberia, with comparative shadow cases, it builds on existing theory that conceptualizes negotiation not as a discrete or formalized event, but as a permanent feature of political life through which elites allocate power, resources, and loyalty. The analysis demonstrates: the persistence of bargaining logics across war and peace, regime types, and shifts in tactics; that bargaining power is often relational and material; “horizontal” bargaining (among elite with power symmetry) and “vertical” bargaining (among elite with power asymmetries) structure elite deal parameters. The paper emphasizes conflict management as the stabilization of bargaining relationships. In doing so, it provides a conceptual vocabulary for analyzing negotiation processes embedded in violent and transactional political systems, which has increasing global relevance.

Keywords: Bargaining power, informal negotiation, violent conflict processes, qualitative methods