Moving away from Fairness and Flexibility: What, When, and Why Managers Reject i-deals

Abstract: Organizations create conditions for individual incentives to maintain and attract talent. In such competitive environments, idiosyncratic deals (i-deals) thrive among valued employees, despite documented evidence of peer reactions. I-deal theory argues that managers grant such requests, seeking to balance flexibility and fairness. We challenge the assumption that managers will engage in rational decision-making when such requests occur by arguing that a general sense of threat in competitive environments and requests for career-promoting i-deals will shadow managerial judgment. Through three studies (and one pilot), we propose and test a model of when and why requests for i-deals will reduce managers’ willingness to grant. Using downward comparison theory, we show that requests for i-deals (on-the-job assignments or outside work developmental opportunities) that promote career advancement within the organization are likely to lower granting when managers feel threatened within their organization. Further, managers who view such requests as a threat will also be more likely to reject them and seek to request their own career-promoting i-deals to retain the status gap. Implications for research and practice are discussed. 

Keywords: idiosyncratic deals, decision-making, threat, careers