A Two-Level Model of Intergroup Conflict: How Overconfidence Influences Leader Behavior and Follower Support

Abstract: Intergroup conflict is widespread and often harmful to all sides. It has long been recognized that leaders play a central role in instigating conflict because they can initiate it unilaterally, even when followers would prefer to avoid it. Here, we investigate another crucial mechanism linking leadership and conflict: followers’ tendency to support conflict-prone individuals as group leaders. Specifically, we argue that certain leader characteristics both (1) increase the likelihood of engaging in conflict and (2) enhance followers’ support for such leaders, and focus on overconfidence as one such characteristic. We find that individuals who exhibit overconfidence are more likely to engage in conflictual decisions in an incentive-compatible multi-round social dilemma game, and that this effect is partially mediated by myopic self-focus (Study 1). Further, we show that leaders who display overconfidence receive stronger support from followers who experience greater fear and greed—two emotions central to intergroup dynamics (Study 2).

Keywords: Conflict, social dilemma, emotions, leader, overconfidence