Multi-Issue Ultimatum Bargaining

Abstract: Negotiators sometimes face final offers that they accept or reject, but not negotiate. We test the hypothesis that denying negotiators voice by making take-it-or-leave-it offers reduces joint gains. Existing research typically operationalizes such ultimatums as single-issue, distributive negotiations, in which the size of the pie is common knowledge and recipients have no voice. We examine the effect of voice on take-it-or-leave-it negotiations using a multi-issue ultimatum bargaining game—a one-shot experimental paradigm that involves five issues, integrative potential, and provides negotiators with private information. In the No-Voice condition, proposers unilaterally crafted an offer, which the responder accepted or rejected. The Voice condition was similar except proposers could let responders set the terms of the offer in any of the issues. In two studies (in-lab and a cross-cultural sample), voice significantly increased joint gains and reduced impasses. These findings generalized across dyads endorsing honor, face, and dignity norms to varying degrees.

Keywords: Negotiation, Ultimatum Game, Voice, Justice, Culture, Honor, Face, Dignity