Voice In Multi-Issue Ultimatum Bargaining

Authors:

Abstract: Negotiators sometimes face final offers that they can accept or reject, but not negotiate. We test the hypothesis that denying voice to negotiators by making take-it-or-leave-it offers reduces joint gains in negotiation. Existing research typically operationalizes such ultimatums as single-issue, distributive negotiations, in which the size of the pie is common knowledge and the recipient has no voice. We examine the effect of voice on take-it-or-leave-it negotiations using a multi-issue ultimatum bargaining game (MIUB)—a modified experimental paradigm that involves five issues, has integrative potential, and provides negotiators with private information. In the No-Voice condition, proposers unilaterally crafted an offer, which the responder accepted or rejected. The Voice condition was similar except proposers could allow responders to decide on any part of the offer (20 proposers gave responders a say). Voice significantly increased joint gains in the MIUB by reducing rejection rates and giving responders the chance to improve offers for themselves.

Track: NEG

Keywords: voice, negotiation, ultimatum game, joint gains