An Analysis of the Peace and Security Council’s management of the 2011 Côte d’Ivoire post-electoral conflict.

Electoral disputes are on the rise on the continent and constitute the causes of violence and armed conflict. According to the Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) 685 conflicts events which between 1990 and 2011 originated from electoral disputes in the world. Africa recorded many electoral-related conflicts, amongst others Côte d’Ivoire in 2000 (178 deaths) in 2007 in Kenya (1502 deaths), Zimbabwe 2008 (114 deaths) and Nigeria (500 deaths). Similarly, the 2010 post-electoral disputes in Côte d’Ivoire caused more than 3000 deaths, plunged the country to armed conflict and prompted the intervention of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union [1]. In sum, the post-electoral gridlock in Côte d’Ivoire has derailed the efforts of social cohesion, peace and sustainable development after a long period of political and security crisis between 2002 and 2011. The article analyses the PSC’s management of the post-electoral Ivoirian conflict in 2011. It scrutinises the literatures and testimonies that capture the occurrences of the Ivoirian conflict. It uncovers that the African conflict response mechanism is scrawny, disorganised and still under construction. Thus, it argues the PSC is ineffective and advocates for an integrated political and military approach in the conflict management undertakings. Finally, it recommends the integration independent electoral observers from the civil society organisations and the participation of women and youth groups to ensure free, fair, transparent and credible elections.