Going with the Momentum: When Exposure to Decreasing Concessions Leads to a Distributive Disadvantage

We propose that making a series of concessions that decrease in size over time (e.g., $1500, $1225, $1205, $1200) signals that senders are reaching their limit and results in a negotiation disadvantage for recipients. Five studies (N = 1748) demonstrate that receiving decreasing concessions caused negotiators to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1-2) and reach less profitable agreements (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. Building on theories of psychological momentum, we demonstrate that this distributive disadvantage occurred because decreasing concessions resulted in inflated perceptions of the sender’s reservation price compared to other concession making strategies. We further show that this disadvantage was reduced when the momentum of the pattern was disrupted semantically (Study 3), and when counterparts focused on their own target price instead (Study 4).