Dovish and hawkish influence in distributive and integrative representative negotiations

Keywords: Negotiations, integrative, distributive, representative, constituency

Abstract: Negotiations between representatives are strongly influenced by constituency pressures. Dovish voices in the constituency can promote a collaborative and problem-solving approach, but can also open the door to exploitation in the negotiation. Two interactive dyadic-negotiation experiments investigate how dovish versus hawkish constituency voices affect representatives’ outcomes in both integrative and distributive negotiations. Findings demonstrate that while representatives of hawkish constituencies claim more value, representatives of dovish constituencies reach higher outcomes in both tasks (Experiment 1). However, when confronted with a hawkish counterpart, the dovish representatives give in and reach lower outcomes (Experiment 2). We explore, but do not find consistent support for, the role of expected future interaction to reduce the effect of hawkish constituencies. Overall, findings suggest that pursuing dovish interests leads to higher outcomes, even in a distributive task, unless the counterpart has hawkish interests.